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Abstract
With the emergence of the digital environment, the issue of “transformative uses”
in copyright law has gained renewed interest in legal literature. While many
authors emphasized the challenge that these transformative practices constituted
for copyright law, there has been a clear lack of comprehensive study of the extent
of copyright law's (in)hospitality to such practices. In addition, too little attention
has been paid to possible solutions to resolve this conflict inside the copyright
regime. This paper aims to contribute to fill these two gaps. In this first paper, we
will provide a comprehensive assessment of the status transformative uses in EU,
Belgian and French law, informed by a vast body of case law. In a second paper,
we will discuss potential solutions drawing inspiration from Canadian copyright
law, which has recently experienced both the introduction of a legal exception
for user generated content, and a court-led shift from a traditional closed-list fair
dealing ...
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While  many   authors   emphasized   the   challenge   that   these   transformative






EU, Belgian and French  law,  informed by a vast body of case   law. In a
second paper,   we will discuss potential solutions drawing inspiration from









into   something   of   their   own1.   In   the   20th  century,   artists   started   to
borrow more  than ever  and after  Duchamp,  developed comprehensive











Conceptual   Art,   etc.   which   fit   in   a   broad   category,   the   so­called





intellectual  creations has  led to  a  popularization of   these practices  of






These   transformative   practices   are   marginalized   by   the   copyright
regime :  indeed, such creative practices based on the reuse of existing
works   are   at   odds  with   a   legal   regime   based   on   the   prohibition   of
unauthorized reproduction. However the goal of a copyright regime is to
encourage   all   forms   of   creativity,   however   alien   they   are   to   the




































including   sculptures,   paintings,   photography   and   other   graphic
















Part),   July  1st,   1992  8  (“Code  de   la  propriété   intellectuelle”   hereafter
CPI).  Since then,  both have been amended to  implement the InfoSoc
Directive 2001/29, respectively through the Law transposing into Belgian
Law   the   European   Directive   2001/29/EC   of   May   22,   2001   on   the
Harmonization of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in
the Information Society, May 22, 20059  and the Law No. 2006­961 on













first   defining   the   originality   criterion,   being   the   very   condition   of
copyright.   The   originality   criterion   has   received   a   certain   level   of
harmonization   in  European   law11  with   the   adoption  by   the  Court  of
Justice   of   the   European   Union   (CJEU)   of   its   (vague)   standard   of
originality as the “author’s own intellectual creation”12. The Court further
held that this same criterion applied to every type of work13  and also




However,   although   this   “personal   stamp   of   the   author”   criterion   has
sometimes been considered as a high threshold, the case  law of  lower
courts  in both Belgium and France largely invalidates this conclusion.
















































































In  Infopaq,   the  CJEU specified   that   to   constitute  a   “reproduction   in
part”,    a work must contain elements of another protected work that
expresses the author's own intellectual creation24. This would mean that




the   exceptions,   see  infra)27.   Accordingly,   and   contrary   to   American
copyright law, it seems that EU law does not require any substantial
similarity requirement conclusive of an infringement, nor allows for any













































French   and   Belgian   case   law   seems   consistent   with   the   CJEU’s
interpretation, since according to both countries highest court (the Court
of   cassation),   reproduction   of   original   elements   of   a  prior  work   in   a
second work falls within the scope of the right of reproduction30. As with
EU law, the scope of protection corresponds with that of originality31.
However,   in   finding   an   infringement   courts  will   often   emphasize   the
similarities over the differences32. Particular illustration of this procedural




within   the   meaning   of   reproduction,     there   is   no   room   at   the
infringement stage for an assessment of the extent of the similarities34.
Despite this potential discrepancy between the definition of reproduction
and the  infringement test,   the  length of  the borrowed element  is  not


























covered by an exception).  In France however,  case  law has developed
that   considers   “accessory   reproduction”  as   falling  outside   the   right  of
reproduction (see infra).
Finally,   only   the   very   act   of   borrowing   infringes   on   the   right   of
reproduction, not similarity per se. Independent creation is therefore a






Database   Directive   (article   5   (b)),   the   InfoSoc   directive   does   not
harmonize the right of adaptation. Many scholars emphasize this point36.
Even though they seem to consider that the law is clear on this point, we
do   have   some   concerns   since   the   CJEU   has   defined   the   originality
standard  without  giving  a  definition  of  what   is  an   “expression”.   It   is







literal   copying   of   the   expression   and   the   second   against   non­literal
copying. If one reads the word “expression” as relating only to the exact
wording, depiction or playing, then adaptation does not fall within the
concept of  reproduction as  interpreted by the Court.  However,   if  one

















what   is   original   in   the   first   work,   would   fall   outside   the   right   of
reproduction. This seems rather at odds with the requirement of a broad
interpretation   of   the   right   of   reproduction   made   by   the   CJEU38.





of   “expression”.  Only   the   Software  Directive  mentions   the   opposition
between the protected “expression in any form of a computer” and the





in   any   form   of   a   computer   program  which   permits   reproduction   in





Nevertheless,   the  Painer  case   provides   evidence   that   the   right   of
reproduction   might   cover   the   right   of   adaptation.   In   the   national
(Austrian) proceedings, it was discussed whether a photo­fit based on a
photograph   should   be   considered   an   adaptation   that   requires   the
photographer’s consent or a free use (freie benutzung). The CJEU, asked





is   an   autonomous   concept   of  EU  law41.  Yet,   in   several   jurisdictions,



































































right   to   control   the   destination   of   a   copy   of   his   work,   that   is,   to
determine the uses  that  can be made of  this  copy.  This  construction














































design   law).   The   Trademark  Directive   and   Regulation   specify   these
legitimate reasons by saying they are met “especially where the condition
of the goods is changed or  impaired after they have been put on the
market”.   To   some   commentators,   the   same   solution   should   apply   to
copyright law55. If so, it would mean that a reworked copy of a work that





























actually   qualifies   for   adaptation   in   some   jurisdictions,   especially   in
Belgium and France58 where adaptation right is considered a part of the
reproduction   right.   In   that   regard,   the   Court   notably   held   that   a
replacement   of   the  medium  is   “… an   alteration   of   the   copy   of   the









the  object   that  was  placed onto   the  market  with   the  consent  of   the
rightholder.












































irrespective   of   whether   they   avail   themselves   of   that   opportunity”65.
Regarding the definition of the ‘public’, the CJEU held that this term
“(…)   refers   to   an   indeterminate   number   of   potential   recipients   and






























EU   law.   –  The   right   of   communication   to   the   public   only   covers








the  French Court  of   cassation  has  explicitly   stated   that   exhibiting  a
photograph  falls  within  the   scope of   the   right  of   communication and


































XI.173,   §   1).   Close   reading   suggests   that   exhibition   of   the  work   is
prohibited any time it has been modified.
In France, nothing in the law entitles the acquirer of the work to the
















regime  is   less  protective,  as  the author  can partially  renounce to  the
enforcement of these rights although he will in any event maintain the



































































modification of  the  shape of  a   logo86;   showing a movie using a video
cassette instead of the 35 mm film (which modifies the rendering of the





































mere   recontextualisation   of   the  work,   either   by   putting   it   in   a   new
context or by changing its meaning. This can be caused through non­
material modifications, but will often be coupled with a physical change
of   the  work   (reproduction   in   part   or   adaptation)91.   Such   immaterial
modifications are often considered as harms to the spirit of the work in
French and Belgian case   law.    Let  us  recall  here   the  case,  discussed
































work in another context (be  it political93,  advertising94,  pornographic95,
associated   with   illegal   practices96  or   causing   a   modification   in   the




leads   to  an alteration  of   the   latter,   since   so   shortened and put   in  a
different context, this work receives through contact with the derivative
a new  look and meaning and therefore  no  longer   reflects   its  author’s
personality”98.









































for  his  painted adpatation/appropriation of   comic  books99.  The act of
copying   (in  whole   or   in   part)   comic   books   thumbnails   involves   the







































see,   the european  framework of  exceptions and  limitations  leave  little
breathing space for the transformative user.
b. Exceptions   and   limitations102  potentially   allowing   for
transformative uses







§   4   CPI),   but   the   Belgian   lawmaker   explicitly   rejected   such
implementation in national law103.
According to the CJEU exceptions must be interpreted strictly104. The
































must   also   be   weighed   against   the   increasing   role   played   by   the
fundamental   rights  paradigm  in   copyright   law,   and   in  particular   the
requirement   by   the   CJEU   in   cases   Painer   and   Deckmyn   that   the







the   public,   that,   unless   this   turns   out   to   be   impossible,   the   source,
including   the   author’s   name,   is   indicated,   and   that   their   use   is   in
accordance with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific
purpose”108.  This  exception  is optional  but  every Member State either
already   had   such   an   exception   at   the   time   they   implemented   the
Directive or has introduced it since109.
The   CJEU   has   given   little   additional   information   regarding   the
interpretation of this exception. Only in  Painer  did the Court address
this exception by specifying that there is no need for the quoting work to
be protected by copyright  (§ 136).   In addition,  the  Court  gave  some





























Generally   speaking,   licit   quotation   supposes   fulfilling   specific
requirements regarding the purpose, length, and form of the quotation.




scientific,   critical  and  informative  purposes112.  Other  purposes   such as
commercial113,  advertising114,  campaign propaganda115  or humorous116  do
not   fit   with   the   authorized   ones   enshrined   in   the   law.   The   same
conclusion is reached for artistic or aesthetic ones. In the case discussed





To   fit   in   one   of   the   authorized   purposes,   quotation   must   remain
accessory   to   a   larger   work.   A   glance   at   a   few   cases   where   this
requirement was not considered satisfied may bring some light on this
condition: a solfeggio method whose essential part consisted of excerpts


































“short   quotation”   requirement   untouched.   Hence,   the   possibility   of
quoting   works   other   than   literary   ones   is   highly   controversial,   in
particular regarding works of visual arts123. The   transformative user is
actually caught between a  rock and a hard place:   either  the  work  is
reproduced only in part, which is taken as an infringement of the moral
right of integrity, or it is reproduced in whole and then it violates the
short   quotation   requirement124.   Indeed  on   this   last   point,   the  French
Supreme Court relentlessly repeats that “reproduction in whole of a work
of   art,   in  whatever   size,   can’t   by   any  means   be   considered   a   short
quotation”  125. Hence, any quotation of a work of art is infringing under

























published   (Belgium)  or  divulged   (France)  works.  The   source  and the
author’s name shall be indicated. Contrary to the case in Belgium, in
France there are no exception to the attribution requirement in the case
it   turns  out   to  be   impossible.  Therefore   in  France,   the   lack  of   such








Hence,   in  our   second example   case,   it   is  doubtful   that  Merpel   could
invoke the quotation exception as a valid defense for the thumbnails used
on  the   IP Kat  blog.  Considering   these  cat  pictures  are  not  used   for












caricature,   parody   or   pastiche”  (art.   5   (3)   (k)   InfoSoc  Directive).  A
number of Member States have not implemented the exception, though



















elaborate   its   meaning.   The   court   crucially   held   that   the   fact   that





















































freedom   of   speech   framework.   This   comes   from   the   particular
circumstances of the Deckmyn case, where the defendant was an activist
member   of   the  Belgian   extreme­right   party  Vlaams  Belang,   and   the
disputed parody was picturing people of colour or wearing the islamic veil
receiving money from a city mayor.
In   these   circumstances,   the   Court   quickly   noted   that   “all   the
circumstances   of   the   case   must   be   taken   into   account”,   and   drew
attention   to   the   fact   that   the  principle  of  non­discrimination  was  an
important  principle  of  EU  law.  The  Court   then  adds   that,  were   the
disputed work deemed discriminatory, authors and right holders would
have   “a   legitimate   interest   in   ensuring   that   the   work   protected   by





open   a   Pandora's   box,   by   including   in   its   reasoning   a   number   of
considerations that are essentially alien to the conditions for the finding
of   parody.  Wouldn't  moral   rights   provisions   or   even   legal   provisions
against   hate   speech   more   suited   to   deciding   whether   a   potentially
discriminatory message should be prohibited?
Belgian  and  French   law.  –  Let  us  now  turn   to   the   legal   regime  for



























































the   aim   of   the   parody.  We  will   then   examine   how   this   traditional
understanding   of   the   concept   of   parody   is   affected   by   the  Deckmyn
ruling. 
The target of the parody. –  It is generally held that the targeted work
















































requires   the  parodist   to   take  no  more   than  necessary   to   achieve  his
goal152, whereas the French one requires twisting or distortion of the prior





confusion154. In the Deckmyn case, the author contended before the Court







































in any case of  reproduction  in whole or  in part of the prior work, the
which cannot be used as such”. Some courts seem however less restrictive.
In   particular,   it   has   been   held   that   the   reproduction   in  whole   and
communication of a poem during a comic radio program benefit from the
exception159.   Recently,   the   reproduction   of   a   photograph   in   a
photomontage   has   been   considered   lawful   as   well160.   Under   peculiar
circumstances, it has been held that works of art borrowing from Belgian
comic  books  author  Hergé   and  surrealist  painter  René  Magritte  were

























161 Court of Appeal of Brussels,  June 14, 2007,  A&M, 2008, p. 23, note D. Voorhoof,
overturned   by  Court   of   cassation,   June   18,   2010,  A&M,   2010,   p.   323,   note  B.

















third   party,   has   been   held   by   some   scholars166  and   a   number   of


















































parody,   namely   that   it  must   “constitute  an   expression   of   humour   or
mockery”175. Humour is the core of parody, regardless of it being smooth,
black,  sarcastic,  dirty,  nonsensical,  etc.  This  requirement  is  critical   in
France,   where   scholars   stress   on   its   cultural   and   traditional






Brussels   (Pres.),  March   4,   2009,  R.A.B.G.,   2009,   p.   1441;   Court   of   Appeal   of
Antwerp, May 2, 2006, A&M, 2006, p. 257.









174 See   Court   of   Appeal   of   Brussels,   June   14,   2007,  A&M,   2008,   p.   23,   note   D.
VOORHOOF ; Court of Appeal of Brussels, January 16, 2012, J.L.M.B., 2013, p. 688.










021857;  Court  of  Appeal  of  Paris,  September  21,  2012,  JurisData  n°  2012­021858




































Correctional  Court  of  Antwerp,  November  25,  2005,  A&M,  2008,  p.  45;  Court  of
Appeal of Antwerp, October 11, 2000, A&M, 2001, p. 357. See also the Opinion of the




On   this   regard,   one  may   remember   that   the  US   Supreme  Court   held   that   the






parody   exception   for   allowing   transformative   uses   in   French   Law:   P.  LESCURE,
Mission “Acte II de l’exception culturelle” – Contribution aux politiques culturelles à






Uncertainties   surrounding   the   exception   for   parody   still   remain
substantial, and several scholars have denounced their resulting chilling
effect on artistic creation183. While the CJEU has provided an outline of
harmonized  EU guidelines,   there  are  numerous   issues   that   still   await
clarification. 
Getting   back   to   our   first   example   case   mentionned   above,   are
Lichtenstein's work parodies? Unless humour is widely understood by the
CJEU as to  include any criticism performed by pop art (if  so...),  the
most  important requirement  is not met. Moreover,  one can doubt the
differences are noticeable (the most important ones being the change of
scale and art means, but is it enough?). In addition, the target of the
parody   is   left   unknown   (comic   books   in   general?)   and   potential
commercial   aim could  play  a   role   (the   frontier  between  pop art  and




EU  law.   –  Some   incidental   reproductions  may  be   allowed  under  EU
copyright   law.  The  list  of  article  5  (3)  of   the Directive contains  two
exceptions encompassing this  idea.  The  first  one concerns the  “use of
works, such as works of architecture or sculpture, made to be located









183 See   D.  VOORHOOF,   “Parodie,   kunstexpressievrijheid   en   auteursrecht”,   note   sous
Brussels,   14   juin   2007,  A&M,   2008,   p.   34 ;   B.  MICHAUX,   “La  BD   et   la   liberté
d’expression face à la marque et au droit des tiers”,  in  E.  CORNU  (coord.),  Bande




184 In   one   case,   the   defendant   contended   Internet   was   a   “public   space”   within   the
meaning of this exception,  that would authorize him to  freely  borrow pictures  he





case   law  conflating   to   some   extent   the   two   exceptions   found   in   the







background   did   not   infringe   copyright   law185.   This   was   actually   an
application   of   basic   copyright   principles   (protection   extends   only   to









was   illicit   because   “(…)   their   appearance,   although   succinct,   was
deliberate   and   repeated,   which   therefore   excluded   any   incidental





hence there was no  ‘representation’  of   the photograph printed on the

















the   reproduction   is   intentional,   it   is   not   accessory189.   But   more
significantly,   these   two   decisions   departed   from   a   restrictive
interpretation of  the  “incidental  reproduction theory”  limited to works
located   in   the  public   space   (that   is,  buildings,  memorials,   sculptures,
etc.). Indeed, since they were concerned respectively with a chair and a
photograph,   these   decisions   extended   the   theory   to  works   located   in
private places.
With   the   adoption   of   the   Directive   and   its   comprehensive   list   of












suggested   this   was   to   put   an   end   to   the   “accessory   reproduction
theory”193. Indeed, this has been the reasoning of one Court which decided
that   a   documentary   on   education   where   pictures   from   a   textbook
appeared (displayed on the walls of the filmed classroom) constituted an











191 Court   of   cassation,  March   15,   2005,  JCP  G,   2005,   II,   10072,   p.   1065,   note  T.




and   exceptions   (inside   copyright   law),   cf.   note   93.  With   regard   to   this   decision







but  on other  grounds   that  departed   from  its   own previous  decisions,
considering   such   accessory   reproductions   as   an   “incidental   inclusion”





























see  e.g.  B.  GALOPIN,   “Accessoire   :   la   Cour   de   cassation   assume   l’exception
prétorienne”, R.L.D.I., 2011/73,pp. 23­24.












Louis  Vuitton  heels   in  an  ad   for  an  H&M dress204;   a  model  wearing
jewelry in an add for duty­free shops in Paris airports205; etc. 
Conclusion under French Law. Since the latest decision of the Court of
cassation,  we   are  aware  of   two  decisions,   one   concuring206,   the   other
opposing207.   This   shows   how   fuzzy   the   limits   of   this   exception   for
incidental uses are under French law, which could cause a chilling effect
among users.  Case  law suggests that this exception gives  little wiggle
room   to   transformative   users.   Significantly,   in   its   assessment   of   the







video   as   the   dancing   children),   nor   “incidental”,   in   the  meaning   of
unintentional (since the background music is the reason why the children




and   French   national   law   clearly   shows   that   our   copyright   laws   are
particularly   inhospitable   to   transformative   uses.   We   saw   that   the
multitude of broadly defined exclusive rights constitutes a tremendous
hurdles for creators of transformative works, as they can most of the time





205 Court of Appeal of Paris,  February 10, 2012,  RTD Comm.,  2012, p. 776, obs. F.
POLLAUD­DULIAN.




Société   M.   Dom   Edizioni,   unpublished,   RG   n°   11/19345   (held   not   infringing:
appearance in a photograph of a lamp, put in context among other furnitures). 
208 P. LESCURE, Mission “Acte II de l’exception culturelle” – Contribution aux politiques













One   can  wonder  whether  European   lawyers   are   fully   aware   of   how
critical   the   situation   is.     If  we   compare   copyright   laws   from various
jurisdictions on the issue of flexibility and freedom to create, current EU
laws  are  clearly  among the  most   restrictive.  For   example,   looking  at
recent findings of fair uses in the US case law209, one could very often





































open   fair   dealing   provision,   arising   from   the   ambitious   reversal   of
precedent by the Canadian Supreme Court since its CCH ruling211. 
211 Supreme Court of Canada, CCH Canadian Limited v. Law Society of Upper Canada,
2004 SCC 13.
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